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ABSTRACT
This qualitative study analyzes the Greek government’s crisis management practice
and public communication efforts during two waves of the COVID-19 pandemic in
2020. Integrating both crisis management theories and the World Health Organization’s pandemic control plans, discourse analysis and case study approaches were
taken to analyze how Greek’s key government and public health authorities communicated with the public using different frames and crisis response strategies. Evaluations
were conducted to assess the Greek government’s crisis communication procedures
and the effectiveness of different rhetorical strategies used as evidenced in public
briefings and public speeches.
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It has already been a year since March 2020 when the World
Health Organization (WHO) announced the spread of a new
strain of coronavirus from Wuhan City, Hubei, in 114 countries worldwide, declaring the COVID-19 epidemic a pandemic (WHO, 2020). The rapid escalation and global spread of
COVID-19 have prompted governments to implement policies
and measures to manage virus transmission and give health
systems time to prepare for and mitigate the impact of the pandemic (Haberstaat et al., 2020; Hale et al., 2020).
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This paper examines the crisis management strategies
used by the Greek government in response to the spread of the
COVID-19 pandemic in Greece. The article focuses on the nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) of pandemic management
and does not take into consideration the medical aspects like vaccine development or medical treatment. In addition, it examines
the crisis communication procedures and the rhetorical strategies
used by the Greek authorities.
The theoretical framework of the study draws on crisis management theory and practice-based models of the WHO and
evaluates the management of the pandemic during the two major
waves in Greece (i.e., March and November 2020). Through the
comparison of both waves, the study aims to examine the strategies and evaluate the models used for both phases by the Greek
Government. The findings add to the growing literature on effective crisis response strategies for COVID-19 pandemic management (Christensen & Lægreid, 2020; Habersaat et al., 2020; Hale
et al., 2020; Manokara et al., 2020) and show the close relation of
crisis management and non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs)
of pandemic management.
The first section contains the theoretical part including crisis
management theory, pandemic management theory, and practicebased models of the WHO and formulates a combination of
both theoretical and practical models. The final section examines
the case study of Greece and its overall pandemic management
throughout the two major COVID-19 waves in Europe.

Literature Review and Theoretical Frameworks
Crisis Management
Crises come in many shapes and forms. Conflicts, human-made
accidents, and natural disasters chronically shatter the peace and
order of societies (Boin et al., 2005). Typically, they are defined as
untimely, but predictable events (Heath & Millar, 2004, p. 33) that
include the element of surprise (Richardson, 1994), and generally
marks a phase of disorder in the seemingly normal development
of a system (Boin et al., 2005). Besides, they create high levels of
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uncertainty and threat or perceived threat to an organization’s
high-priority goals (Seeger et al., 1998).
Crisis management is the approach an organization takes to
handle emerging troubles and rapidly emerging issues of contention, risk, disasters, accidents, emergencies, and characteristically
uncontrollable problems (Bowen & Lovari, 2020). There are several
models of effective crisis management and communication (e.g.,
Coombs, 2004; Coombs & Holladay, 2002, 2008; Hearit, 2006;
Heath, 1998; Pearson & Mittroff, 1993). Some relate the crisis with
the attribution of responsibility that emerges from the crisis itself
or stakeholders (Coombs, 2004; Coombs & Holladay, 2002, 2008),
whereas others focus more on mitigating or minimizing the challenges and damages caused by the crisis (Benoit, 1995; Dezenhall,
2011; Gilbert & Lauren, 1980; Hearit, 2006; Heath, 1998).
A crisis unfolds through three main stages: the pre-crisis phase,
the crisis phase, and the post-crisis phase (Bowen & Lovari, 2020).
Those three main phases form the crisis cycle. The pre-crisis phase
involves the prevention of, and preparation for, crises in order to
minimize damage to the organization (Coombs & Laufer, 2018).
“It allows time to research and plan for broad types of crises so that
response can be expedited” (Bowen & Lovari, 2020, p. 3). Therefore, issues management is a process that helps organizations to
search and early detect problems and proceed to preemptive resolutions (Bowen & Lovari, 2020; Heath, 2002, 2018).
Although issues management in the pre-crisis phase cannot
always prevent a crisis from happening, the main objective is to
minimize or mitigate the risks or negative effects of a potential crisis (Coombs & Holladay, 2010). Subsequently, risk assessment and
management contribute to the timely identification of the potential danger an event can bring, so that it can be managed on time
(Comfort, 2007; Rickard et al., 2013; Sellnow et al., 2017).
The crisis phase represents the response to the crisis, including the organization’s response and the response of its stakeholders (Coombs & Laufer, 2018). There are several crisis management
models like Heath’s (1998) 4R model where the four “R’s” represent a stage: Reduction, Readiness, Response, and Recovery.
Diers-Lawson’s (2017, 2020) Stakeholder Relationship Model,
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which emphasizes the role of stakeholders during a crisis and the
management according to their attitudes. Coombs’s (1998, 2007)
Situational Crisis Communication Theory and Benoit’s (1995)
Image Restoration Theory focus mainly on the reputational and
communicational aspect of a crisis but can also be implemented
in general crisis management procedures, especially in situations
that evolve attribution of blame. These models cover both communicational and operational crisis management.
Effective crisis management can be summarized in five basic
strategic steps: (a) the timely identification of the type of crisis,
where and when it is possible (Coombs, 2014; Diers-Lawson, 2017,
2020); (b) the swift reduction of the main crisis effects (Heath,
1998); (c) damage control (Dezenhall, 2011) in case the situation becomes or is already uncontrollable; (d) narrative control
through strategic communications (An et al., 2010; Benoit, 1995;
Coombs, 2007; Hearit, 2006); and (e) building resilience against
crisis regeneration (Heath, 1998).
Pandemic Crisis Management Strategies and
WHO’s Practice-Based Model
This section focuses on pandemic management strategies from
literature and practice-based models and combines them to shed
further light on the general crisis management theory and practice.
According to Pan and Meng, “Health crises appear to be
increasingly preoccupied with invisible, unpredictable, and
uncontrollable risks in a global society” (2016, p. 95). Globally,
human populations are more urbanized, which may allow viruses
to be transmitted within populations more easily (Reissmann et
al., 2006). Pandemics and epidemics are proven to be a threat to
countries because they may produce megacrises like the COVID19 pandemic. A pandemic example apart from COVID-19 is the
H1N1 influenza pandemic, a global outbreak of a new influenza
A virus, completely different from the previous ones (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2016).
Pandemics occur when a new virus emerges that can easily
infect humans and spread from person to person in an effective
and permanent way; very few are going to be immune and there is
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no vaccine available (CDC, 2016; WHO, 2018a). Until a vaccine or
effective treatment becomes available, public behavior and adherence to national and subnational response strategies—notably
social, physical, and social distancing measures—will continue to
be key measures for controlling the virus (Habersaat et al., 2020).
Especially during a pandemic period given the limited response
time, dynamic infectious conditions, and intense public pressure,
lead health agents are supposed to be capable of sensemaking, evaluating the nature and scope of the pandemic, and searching for
an appropriate response (Lai, 2012). During the SARS outbreak
contact tracing as well as other strategies like the involvement of
the public in maintaining good health habits reinforced a sense of
control in an otherwise difficult and confusing time (Tiong, 2004).
The management and dissemination of public information during
any crisis are critical (Glantz, 2014).
Pandemic crisis management mainly depends on the epidemiological data provided by scientists and the main operational
response measures are directed by the capacity of a country’s
healthcare units. Limiting the basic reproductive number, or the
number of secondary infections from an ill person, is a tremendous opportunity for local communities (Glantz, 2014, p. 563).
Epidemiological models for monitoring the evolution of the pandemic (e.g., Froese, 2020; Luo, 2020) determine the operational
crisis management measures a government needs to implement.
In the pandemic crisis management literature as well as in
the practice-based models of the WHO, the non-pharmaceutical
interventions (NPIs) include restrictions and reductions of social
gatherings and crowds, restrictions of movement, the closing of
department stores, bars, commentary, university institutions, as
well as public awareness campaigns on hand hygiene, use of protective equipment and observance distances in social gatherings
(Bell et al., 2009; Cadogan & Hughes, 2021; Peng, 2008; Reynolds & Quinn Crouse, 2008). The CDC and WHO’s plans have
primarily focused on detection and disease control through (1)
surveillance and early detection, (2) community containment
strategies (movement restrictions, facility closure, and healthcare
service continuity) that would decrease disease transmission, and
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(3) mass prophylaxis strategies using vaccines and antiviral medication, when available (Reissman et al., 2006).
More severe measures include travel restrictions and the closure of the borders (Cadogan & Hughes, 2021; Manokara et al.,
2020). Containment measures may prevent transmission, or at
least suppress or slow the spread of a pandemic, allowing time
for targeted use of medical interventions (Reissman et al., 2006).
During the COVID-19 outbreak in 2020 most of those NPI measures were taken by most countries to contain and delay the transmission of the virus (Cadogan & Hughes, 2021). NPIs serve to
delay the spread of infection, buy time, decrease the total number
of infections, and reduce the spread of infection by each individual
(Glantz, 2014, p. 563).
The WHO has developed a series of plans and proposals for
pandemic management (WHO, 2018a, 2018b, 2019a, 2019b). The
WHO’s model (2010a, 2018a) for influenza pandemic management
is divided into six main phases which follow the model of phases
of development of a pandemic influenza crisis (WHO, 2010a).
According to this model (WHO, 2010a), the first phase concerns
the quiet period before the outbreak of a disease. The second and
third phase involves detecting a virus that has been transmitted
from animals to humans and poses a potential pandemic threat
without, however, having sufficient human-to-human transmission capable of causing an outbreak at the community level. The
fourth phase is characterized by the confirmation of the ability of
the disease to spread from person to person who can cause spread
in the community. The ability of the disease to spread in the community is a significant risk increase for developing a pandemic,
but it does not mean that it is certain or inevitable. In the fifth
phase, the human spread affects at least two countries in one geographical area. Finally, a pandemic begins by an outbreak at the
community level in at least one country other than the geographical area of the virus’s origin. The last two phases concern the phase
of de-escalation of a pandemic crisis (WHO, 2010b).
Combining Theory and Practice for Pandemic Management
The general pandemic model of WHO is being combined with the
crisis management theory. The WHO model shows the stages for
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the development of a pandemic. On the other hand, crisis management theory includes models that elaborate on management processes in each crisis stage. The combination of both models may
provide insights that help identify the effective and timely application of pandemic management strategies based on the pandemic
crisis cycles and crisis management procedures. For example, issue
management is a delayed response when a crisis has entered its
main phase. Respectively, precautionary measures like obligatory
masks or contact tracing as a main measure during the heat of the
crisis would be an ineffective approach.
The first three phases of the WHO pandemic model are being
identified with the corresponding pre-crisis phase of crisis management, which contains issues management and search for
potential risks or threats. A pandemic environmental monitoring
and regular risk assessments are of high importance to regulate
the transmission rate and fortify the health system of a country.
The main crisis phase relates to phases 4–6 of the WHO pandemic
model, where the identification of human transmission has been
confirmed, while there is a significant spread in the community.
The sixth phase is a particular turning point in a pandemic crisis,
in which a disease is widely spread and somewhat uncontrollable.
Crisis management at this level requires the application of strict
NPIs as a damage control strategy. Resilience building can be identified with the possibility of mass vaccination or fortification of the
health system.
Grounded in pandemic management theory and practice, this
study explores the following research questions:
RQ1: What were the main pandemic containment measures used in
managing the first and the second waves of the COVID-19 pandemic
in Greece?
RQ2: What were the differences between the first and the second
waves of pandemic management in Greece in terms of crisis management and crisis communication?
RQ3: What were the main (a) rhetorical strategies and (b) dominant
frames used by Greek authorities for crisis communication management during the two pandemic waves?
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Methodology
The methodology used is qualitative content analysis with elements
from rhetorical and discourse analyses. Qualitative content analysis is appropriate for a relatively small amount of textual matter
(Krippendorff, 2004; Van Evera, 1997). Besides, qualitative content analysis allows the liberty of viewing the case from the inside
out and seeing it from the perspective of those involved (Gillham,
2000). The qualitative content analysis was mainly used to identify
the NPI strategies used for the containment of COVID-19, drawn
from the official Greek governmental internet pages (i.e., gov.gr,
eody.gr, and covid19.gov.gr).
The rhetorical analysis focuses on how messages are delivered
and with what effects (Krippendorff, 2004). For this reason, it was
used in the examination of the crisis communication discourse
of three main crisis management authorities. However, the analysis did not focus on argumentation building but on rhetorical
strategies through the examination under existing rhetorical
typologies and tools. Therefore, discourse analysis, especially
political discourse analysis (Filardo-Llamas & Boyd, 2018), was
also applied. In particular, the pre-existing typologies and rhetorical tools used for the analysis included framing theory and
the image restoration theory by Benoit (1995) that consists of five
main strategies to avoid blame or restore one’s image (i.e., denial,
evading responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action,
and mortification).
The crisis communication analysis was conducted on
(1) speeches from daily press briefings of two main public figures
at the front line of the Greek government’s pandemic communication: President of the Experts Committee, Professor Sotiris Tsiodras; Undersecretary of Civil Protection and Crisis Management
Nikos Chardaliasand and (2) the regular official addresses from
the Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, gathered during the first
and the second waves of COVID-19 pandemic management in
Greece. The time frame of the research was from March 3 until
May 4, 2020 (Wave 1), and from the end of September until the
end of October 2020 (Wave 2). A total of 60 transcripts of the
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press briefings containing the speeches of Professor Tsiodras and
Undersecretary Chardalias with the Q&A section as well as the
public addresses of the Prime Minister Mitsotakis were analyzed.
A total of 388 rhetorical strategies were coded and analyzed.

Case Study:
Managing COVID -19 Pandemic Crisis in Greece
Managing the First Wave of COVID-19 Pandemic in Greece
Pre-Crisis Phase

The first wave of COVID-19 arrived in Greece almost 2 months
after the outbreaks reported in China in January 2020. From
January 22, Greece entered the pre-crisis phase where issues and
risk management measures were taken. Until mid-February 2020
the Greek Ministry of Health monitored the situation in China.
The risk of imminent contamination in Greece was very low at
that time; therefore, the measures taken focused mostly on preparations in case an infected person was identified.
During this preparatory phase, an expert committee of epidemiologists was established to monitor the situation and to advise
the government. At the end of February, given the outbreak situation in Italy, the danger for Greece became very imminent. The
National Organization of Public Health (EODY) applied contact
tracing for the cases coming from Italy when a person developed
symptoms. The organization also issued an information package
advising regular temperature testing to those who traveled recently
and developed a list of countries that were at risk.
Since the imported cases from Italy were unavoidable, the
Greek Government suspended all carnival festivities that were
programmed until March 7. Furthermore, the Ministry of Public
Health published a series of information regarding personal protection against coronavirus, the 13 reference hospitals throughout
the country, and the new telephone line of EODY for the coronavirus with a 24/7 operation (Onmed.gr, 2020). The suspension of
carnival events together with the informative measures prepared
the citizens psychologically and informatively for the impending
crisis and saved time for an uncontrollable outbreak.
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Main Crisis Phase

The first confirmed case of COVID-19 in Greece was reported
on February 26; however, the main crisis phase began after the
return of a tourist group from Israel (Iefimerida.gr, 2020). From
that point on, the situation evolved rapidly. On March 16, the
Secretary-General of General Secretariat for Civil Protection
Nikos Chardalias was promoted to the Undersecretary of Civil
Protection and Crisis Management and became head of the operational aspect of the COVID-19 crisis. Τhe newly appointed
Undersecretary joined the press briefings together with the
President of the Experts Committee, Professor Sotiris Tsiodras,
steadily at 6:00 every afternoon to inform the public on the evolution of the outbreak. The professor focused on the medical developments concerning the pandemic and the Undersecretary on the
governmental decisions and the operational crisis management
measures.
The main goal of the government at that time was “to save time
to further strengthen the national health system, and to protect
the most vulnerable” (Petsas, 2020). The initial measures taken for
that purpose included the closure of all educational institutions,
the suspension of any kind of conferences and events that gather
more than 1,000 people, the prohibition of sport events gatherings, and strong advice on hygiene measures at any gathering of
more than 50 people.
Two days later, on March 13, the implementation of the measure “We Stay Home” began. All citizens are invited to stay at home
as long as possible and go out only when necessary. At the same
time, special permits were given to working parents, so that they
could take care of their children at home and avoid contact with
their grandparents, who belong to vulnerable groups.
On March 22, in a televised public address, the Prime Minister
Mitsotakis announced his decision to proceed with “a prohibition
on all unnecessary movement of citizens throughout the territory”
(Mitsotakis, 2020). Citizens needed to have a special permit by
SMS or signed by themselves which included only six reasons for
leaving their house. In essence, this permission was not given by
an official government body nor was its truthfulness checked by
the authorities but was more an enhancement of the “individual
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responsibility.” An absence of the document or the SMS would
result in a fine.
The severe lockdown measures were maintained for 6 weeks
and included school closure; distance working; and closure of all
marketplaces, bars, cafés, and the international borders. In the
meantime, a lot of public services went digital to facilitate transactions with the public sector.
The lockdown measures were stricken toward the Easter holidays, where people were expected to move to nearby villages or
holiday homes. The measures included a strong justification for
the reason for movement and prohibition of domestic travels.
Besides, police controls rose during the holidays. The main reason
was to avoid further spreading of the virus to the provinces since
until that time the main spread of the disease was restricted in the
two big cities of Greece, Athens and Thessaloniki.
Crisis Communication

In parallel with the operational crisis management measures
undertaken during the first coronavirus outbreak in Greece, a
major communication campaign was established to inform the
public about the threat and danger of COVID-19. The communication was centrally planned and executed. As the crisis
unfolded, the daily Press Briefings held by Professor Tsiodras and
Undersecretary Chardalias became a routine in the everyday life
of the lockdown citizens.
These regular press briefings were important communication and managerial tools which showed the Greek citizens the
constant presence of the state and potentially acted as a stress
reliever for the situation. Besides, the profile of Professor Tsiodras
became a symbol of leadership in the crisis management process
and quickly gained the trust of the citizens. Nevertheless, for serious decisions and changes in strategy, Prime Minister Mitsotakis
directly addressed the public about the situation and the decisions
made and actions taken by the government.
Furthermore, the communication slogan of “We Stay at Home/
Menoume Spiti” with the logo1 (showing a nice, lovely home), was
liked by the public and immediately began to circulate by all TV
1. “We Stay Home” Logo: https://menoumespiti.gr/
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channels. In effect, the General Secretariat of Civil Protection
took effort in developing strategic messaging and advertisements
to inform the public of the new everyday life and precautionary measures that the people must take. In the advertisements
beloved TV actors or doctors participated to give the right tone
to the message.2
The strategic communication messaging was very coherent
among the three main frontline figures: Prime Minister Mitsotakis, the President of the Expert Committee Professor Tsiordas,
and Undersecretary of Civil Protection Chardalias. Prime Minister Mitsotakis represented the political side of the crisis management procedure giving a tone of unity; Undersecretary Chardalias
represented the decision-making body, and the executive aspect of
crisis management; and Professor Tsiodras represented the scientific and medical aspects of management. Besides, the latter tried
to promote a more human profile during the press briefings, most
likely due to his character, which helped convince the public to
listen to him and maximize the approval rating for the crisis management procedure institutionalized by government authorities.
The main frames that were mobilized rhetorically during the
whole time of the main crisis were the war frame, and the individual social responsibility frame. The War Frame was introduced by
the Prime Minister in his first address to the public on March 11.
“We are at War! With an enemy that is invisible but not invincible.
Because if we succeed to limit the transmission of the virus, we can
give time to our Health System to deal with the emergency calls.”
(Mitsotakis, March 11, 2020)

Words like “frontline,” “enemy,” “weapons against the virus,”
“battle,” “sacrifices,” “target,” and metaphors as “forts of life” constructed the semantic ecology of the war frame. The political managers (Prime Minister Mitsotakis and Undersecretary Chardalias)
used both the war frame; however, not in the same capacity. Prime
Minister Mitsotakis used it as his main strategic frame, whereas
Undersecretary Chardalias used it as a support frame. Professor
Tsiodras, on the other hand, did not use this frame almost at all.
2. Civil Protection Information Kit: https://www.civilprotection.gr/en/media-gallery

Managing COVID-19 Pandemic Crisis: The Case of Greece

399

The individual social responsibility frame was being used by all
three leading public figures/leading authorities during their public
briefings on the pandemic. Contrary to the war frame, this individual frame seems to be the main frame used by Professor Tsiodras and Undersecretary Chardalias. This frame included mainly
a call to the citizens to protect their hygiene and keep social distancing to limit the spread of the disease. Indirectly through this
frame, Prime Minister Mitsotakis pointed out the citizens as the
primary safeguards of national health.
It all depends on us all and our behavior whether the government
needs to take even more drastic control measures. (Mitsotakis,
March 19, 2020)

Consequently, this frame was often used to blame directly or indirectly individual citizens and the general public for not following
the public health measures to contain the spread of the disease.
Also, at this point, I want to emphasize that any discussion or various
excuses for moving during those days (means the eastern vacations),
is a completely irresponsible and anti-social attitude and I want to
explain why . . . (Chardalias, April 7, 2020)

Nevertheless, the individual responsibility frame was used by
Professor Tsiodras more as an incentive to motivate the public and
offer an explanation for the reasons why social distancing is vital
for the containment of the virus spread and why social responsibility is a sign of freedom.
Our collective thinking, so as not to burden the neighbor with the
spread of the virus, not to overload the health structures, is and
remains in the coming weeks our main goal. The virus ( . . . ) reminds
us that free societies thrive on rules of social responsibility. (Tsiodras,
April 6, 2020)

This frame was used almost under the same conditions by all
three leading authority figures. The rhetorical justification of the
frame was threefold: (a) Ideology: Democracy and Freedom as
vital parts of the Western society “demand” the participation of
the citizens and thus social responsibility; (b) Hygiene—practical
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use: social responsibility as a pandemic containment measure;
(c) Scapegoat—blame shifting accusing those who do not follow
the precautionary measures as socially irresponsible and dangerous for society.
The only way to protect our loved ones, our way of life, our neighborhoods, our homeland, is the path of individual responsibility. And
that means one thing: we follow the instructions. We stay at home.
We faithfully apply the rules of hygiene. (Chardalias, March 16, 2020)

Another strategy used frequently by the three main crisis
actors was the strategy of bolstering. All three public figures used
this strategy to praise both the work of the government
The Government will do everything necessary, when necessary and
often earlier than necessary. Nevertheless, believe me: No massive
measure can replace individual responsibility. And in our open democratic societies, no central decision works, unless it is shared first by
all citizens. (Mitsotakis, March 11, 2020)

and the quick reaction of measures taken
The government is facing an unprecedented crisis. And it reacted
quickly. (Mitsotakis, March 13, 2020)

as well as to praise the people for practicing “social responsibility”
or for the healthcare workers for doing a good job.
And I want to thank them (the healthcare workers), once again, on
behalf of all the citizens. Our biggest gain, however, from this unprecedented crisis has a name. And it’s called Trust. Trust in the State, the
Government the fellow citizen! Because, in 50 days, myths of decades
were dispelled. And conclusions were drawn, which will accompany
us for a long time. It has been shown, for example, that the state must
be evaluated primarily based on its effectiveness. And that, when the
state does not become a slave of power, then it becomes a real “State.”
(Mitsotakis, March 13, 2020)

The strategy of bolstering was used several times by all three
main public health authority figures in almost all their speeches
and press briefings. The main aim, as can be concluded, was to bolster their image or the image of the government to show strength
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and liability to the institutional pandemic management. There are
several explanations for its frequent use. Comparing bolstering
strategy with the individual social responsibility frame, it provides
strategic advantage by emphasizing on the one hand, the government has done anything in its power to manage the crisis; on the
other, it is the people’s responsibility to follow the measures and
remain healthy. This way, the government tries to construct, preemptively, a possible scapegoat to shift the blame for a possible
failure in the future. Another explanation for the frequent use of
bolstering strategy may lie with the past failures of governments’
attempts of handing public crises, which indicated the need of
restoring the image of the government in order to gain the trust
of the people.
The first pandemic wave in Greece practically ended with the
easing of lockdown measures after May 4. During the Summer
(May–October) of 2020, the cases were kept low, and it was possible to fully reopen the economy. This interim crisis phase consisted
of the post-crisis phase of the first wave and the early pre-crisis
phase of the second wave.
Managing the Second Wave of COVID-19 Pandemic in Greece
Pre-Crisis Phase

The second wave began in October when suddenly the cases began
to increase rapidly. Nevertheless, this time the problem occurred
only when the intensive care units began to increase. The difference
with the first wave can be summarized in that living with COVID19 became normal and the healthcare system was strengthened to
deal with more cases. This led to a more relaxed pre-crisis phase
compared to the first wave.
October was the pre-crisis month. Although precautionary
measures should have been taken, the first new measures to stop
the spread during the second wave came only in mid-October
when the government announced the obligatory use of masks
everywhere. At that time, the daily confirmed cases were around
300–400 a day according to EODY. However, as the numbers
increased the circumstances also changed. The situation got out
of hand particularly in northern Greece. At the end of October,

402

ASPRIADIS

the reported cases reached almost 3,000 a day, putting enormous
pressure on the health system, especially in northern Greece.
Main Crisis Phase

The main crisis stage came from Northern Greece when
Thessaloniki (the second-largest city in Greece) and Serres,
a nearby city, witnessed a major outbreak. On November 3 the
country was divided into two zones: to the regions with imminent
danger and with excessive danger. For the latter, the lockdown
measures imposed included closing of theaters, businesses, restaurants, borders, and free movement to and from without any excuse
or a justified reason. For the regions in the imminent danger zone,
the restaurants and theaters closed but other retail businesses and
shops remained open.
Two days later and as the situation escalated, a general
lockdown for the whole country was decided. Beginning on
November 7 and for almost 3 weeks (initially planned but was
extended later) everything closed except for schools, which closed
eventually 1 week later, and free movement was prohibited without an SMS or special license. Until that time the main message of
the government was the denial of a potential lockdown.
The severe measures were taken too late and could not stop
the spread in time. In Northern Greece, hospitals were on the
edge and patient transportation to other cities including Athens
was deemed necessary. In addition, the pre-crisis phase was not
exploited in taking mild measures in time to avoid deteriorating
the situation.
Crisis Communication

Communication during the second wave was slightly different
than the first. The press briefings returned to a regular basis in
October. However, Professor Tsiodras did not return, and other
members of the committee took his role in a rotation. Prime
Minister Mitsotakis addressed the public four times from the end
of September until the announcement of the general lockdown at
the beginning of November.
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These slight changes in the communication strategy of the government together with the adaptation of the citizens to the pandemic lifestyle contributed to minimizing the public’s feeling of an
upcoming second crisis. The rotational change of the epidemiologists in the press briefings also minimized the coherence of the
messages and the effects of continuity to the first wave, including
the connection/identification with leadership figures as well as the
cohesion of the government strategic communication.
In the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in Greece,
the strategic orientation of the messages slightly differed in the
speeches given by Prime Minister Mitsotakis. The war frame,
which was the master frame during the first wave period in his
speeches, was replaced by the individual social responsibility frame.
The reason for that change was apparently the fact that during
the pre-crisis phase in October the basic response strategy was to
mobilize the citizens to keep the precautionary measures to avoid
the spread of the disease and eventually a lockdown.
To enhance the frame but also to highlight a new risk for the
upcoming crisis, the Prime Minister Mitsotakis used strategies of
rhetorical risk increase.
After a long period of stability, the cases are increasing exponentially
in our country as well. And scientists warn that, soon, the new pandemic will shake the resilience of the National Health System. Challenging not only patients but also our doctors and nurses. (Mitsotakis,
October 31, 2020)

However, the main rhetorical strategy used by Prime Minister Mitsotakis during the second wave of the pandemic was the
strategy of bolstering/self-praise. This time, this strategy was implemented in an apologetic/image restoration manner in order to bolster the image of the government and address all the criticism that
was initiated against it either from the citizens (e.g., masks denial
movements) or the political opposition (accusation of mismanagement of the secondary crises and other measures like school
opening).
The government, I remind you, is fighting on many fronts at the
same time: National issues, Immigration, Economy, but also natural
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disasters. But especially in the war for health, we need the conscious
citizen as an ally more than anywhere else. (Mitsotakis, Sept. 24, 2020)

The strategy of bolstering also aimed to enhance the image of
the prime minister himself mainly to restore the trust in his figure
as a leader and crisis management authority as it was during the
previous wave of the pandemic.
I have proved, after all, that I do not hesitate to make difficult decisions quickly. But in order to tame the new wave of the pandemic, the
state, scientists and citizens must work even more closely, with more
trust in each other. (Mitsotakis, Sept. 24, 2020)

A new input in the strategic communication of the prime minister is the increased use of a new frame, the frame of hope. This
frame was used more frequently than in the first wave, where it
was almost absent in the public briefings.
I will close, however, with an optimistic message. Because for the first
time since the beginning of this adventure, the prospect of having a
safe and effective vaccine appears on the horizon. And the government has made sure we get it on time, and make it available to everyone, as quickly as possible. At the same time, the flu vaccination is
proceeding according to plan. (Mitsotakis, Oct. 22, 2020)

The hope frame was used to motivate the public to show resilience
and patience for the second wave. The storytelling of an imminent
“happy ending” of the pandemic would give the citizens strength
to follow the measures for some more time. Especially during the
lockdown in November, the press briefings included the publication of the government plans regarding the vaccination process
which would begin in January 2021.
In sum, Prime Minister Mitsotakis’s discourse, during this
period, forms the strategy of transcendence. Apparently, the failure to effectively manage the pre-crisis phase of the second wave
of the health crisis led to a second general lockdown, which was
considered a failure due to the burden of secondary crises. The
increased use of bolstering strategy (especially self-praise) shows
that the prime minister tried to restore his image toward society
in an attempt to transcend from explaining why the situation got
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from “We are far away from a lockdown” (Chardalias, Oct. 16,
2020) to the imposition of a lockdown 15 days later.

Discussion
In light of RQ1, the findings show that the basic pandemic management tool used in both pandemic waves in Greece was a severe
lockdown, including all the economic activities that related to
gatherings in public places and prohibition of unnecessary movement. Distance working from home was imposed for all administrative and service-related staff. A slight difference between the
two pandemic waves was the imposition of obligatory masks in all
public places during the second wave.
Although the same measures were imposed in both waves, the
second was considered a more serious one. One reason might be
the late imposition of containment measures and the absence of
precautionary measures during the initial phase of the crisis in
early to mid-October. This suggests a failure in the proper identification of the crisis phases.
Regarding RQ2, the findings suggest that during the first wave,
Greece seemed to have taken advantage of all the crisis phases,
drawing up action plans early on, and aimed to prevent a large
and uncontrolled influx of cases. Damage control strategies like
the closure of all activities that contained gatherings were taken
during the main crisis phase. Strategies were adjusted when necessary according to the environmental scanning. This way, Greece
managed to prevent the spread by being one step “ahead of the
disease.” At the same time, the government increased the resilience
of the health system, preparing for worst-case scenarios.
At the communication level, during the first wave of the
pandemic in Greece, the ongoing information campaigns in the
media, as well as the cohesive strategic communication message
at the daily press briefings by the same crisis managers, increased
the level of trust by the public, limiting the spread of fake news
and disinformation. The crisis management objective was clearly
communicated from the beginning during the first wave. On the
contrary, during the second wave, the delayed response, or the
total absence of precautionary measures before the cases got out of
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control, led to a more severe crisis. Furthermore, the government
authorities’ crisis communication during the second wave failed
to inform the citizens of the state of emergency at the pre-crisis
phase. Reassuring messages misinformed the citizens on the real
situation. Besides, the rotation of the experts’ committee representatives in the press briefings led to the weakening of the strategic communication messaging. The objective, this time, was not
clearly defined and communicated based on the data analyzed.
As far as RQ3 is concerned, the main rhetorical strategy (RQ3a)
used was the bolstering/self-praise which aimed at the enhancement of the leadership image and the defense of the measures
taken by the government. The dominant frames (RQ3b) were the
war frame, and the individual social responsibility frame. During
the first wave, the war frame was dominant, whereas, during the
second, the individual social responsibility frame took its predominant place. The change shows that the aim of Greek public health
authorities was to mobilize the citizens to keep the protective measures and to avoid a lockdown.
Consequently, the findings of this study suggest that the first
wave was managed more effectively than the second one. The
change in decisive variables such as leadership communication
and failure of following the crisis cycle vigilantly affected Greek
government’s pandemic management outcomes. As this study
argues, early management measures would have prevented an
uncontrolled escalation of the pandemic during the second wave.
A fundamental limitation of the study is the examination
of the managerial process in only one country, where the same
government handles two discrete crises caused by two surges of
COVID-19 cases. Another limitation is the absence of supportive
medical and epidemiological data that could provide important
additional variables. Future research may focus on comparative
studies with more countries to get more evidence on a broader
overview of effective pandemic management. Besides, follow-up
studies should be carried out, based on and expanding the current
research framework, to further understand the ongoing evolution
of the crisis management of the pandemic in Greece and other
countries throughout 2021.
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